Peace is a challenge in post-Rabbani Afghanistan |
Washington has pointedly accused Pakistan of having ties with the dreaded Taliban militia. Despite unprecedented diplomatic pressure and Congressional arm-twisting over aid to Islamabad, Pakistan is in no hurry to launch a military operation in the last semi-autonomous tribal region of North Waziristan. With the US Senate Appropriations Committee’s passing of a bill that places the condition on all American financial assistance to Pakistan that action must be taken against the Haqqani network and other terrorist groups associated with al-Qaeda, Washington’s shortsighted policy towards Islamabad has been exposed yet again.
While Washington blames Islamabad for North Waziristan-based terrorists operating deep inside Afghanistan, Pakistani officials question the efficacy of the NATO troops and sophisticated military wherewithal the US has at its disposal. Most parts of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border remain unmanned from the Afghan side, as compared to 1,000 manned border checkpoints on the Pakistani side. The militants’ capacity to choose and successfully attack targets at will, despite layers of security around Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan has not waned over the past decade. Defense strategists understand that Pakistan has been avoiding launching a military operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network, because its military is engaged in consolidating the gains in those tribal areas previously cleared of militants. Other analysts, mostly Western or Indian, fear that Islamabad desires to use the Haqqani group as a point of leverage in Afghanistan’s power struggle. Pakistani military and civilian officials deny such a scenario and cite operational limitations for the delay.
Owing to the evaporating mandate of the Karzai government in Kabul and worsening relations between Islamabad and Washington, hope for an amicable solution seems remote. Even if a new Pashtun versus non-Pashtun feud does not emerge, an appropriate replacement for Rabbani will be hard to agree upon. Pashtun influence in the Karzai regime may be further diluted by greater Indian influence in Afghanistan, as well as the US’s reactionary posturing towards Pakistan.
A successful transition for Afghanistan won’t be possible without a minimum of consensus among the NATO countries, as well as Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors. Within Afghanistan, the Taliban are not the only militia blocking the way to peace: The likes of Hekmatyar also enjoy enormous clout in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country.
The US is failing to meet the goals set at the last Bonn conference and realities on the ground require foreign troops to prolong their presence on Afghan soil. Washington and its NATO allies are beset with newer challenges going into December’s Bonn conference, following the no less important İstanbul meeting. Any sense of normality in Kabul is only on the surface, if the US and Afghanistan fail to revive a good working relationship with Pakistan and if a widely accepted Pashtun candidate does not fill the space left by Rabbani on the High Peace Council. Delegates to the İstanbul conference will need a miracle to cool things off, ahead of the much-anticipated Bonn conference.
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